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“And why am I under arrest?” he then asked.  “That's something we're not allowed to tell you.  
Go into your room and wait there.  Proceedings are underway and you'll learn about 
everything all in good time . . .  If you carry on having as much good luck as you have been 
with your arresting officers then you can reckon on things going well with you.” 2 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In 1994, Michigan’s legislature approved sweeping changes to the state’s domestic 
violence laws.  Among other things, the new “domestic relations personal protection order” 
statute3 permits individuals to petition the court for an ex parte injunction against a named 
respondent which becomes immediately enforceable when signed by the judge.  These orders 
may enjoin a wide range of behaviors, including otherwise licit conduct,4 thereby subjecting the 
individual against whom the PPO has been issued to warrantless arrest and criminal contempt 
proceedings5 for engaging in otherwise legal or even constitutionally protected conduct.6  
Moreover, since the order may be enforced without notice,7 an individual may be arrested 
without any knowledge (either actual or constructive) prior to the incident leading to the arrest 
that his or her actions violated a court order.8  In short, “[t]his means that police officers can 
arrest people for violation of orders even if the individuals had no notice of them.”9   
                                                 
2 FRANZ KAFKA, THE TRIAL 1 (David Wyllie, trans. 2003). 
3 MCLA 600.2950 (West 2004). 
4 See infra, note 33 and accompanying text. 
5 MCLA 600.2950(23). 
6 See infra, note 33 and accompanying text. 
7 MCLA 600.2950(12). 
8 See, eg., MARY M. LOVIK, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: A GUIDE TO CIVIL AND CRIMINAL PROCEEDING, 2d. ed. (2001).  
Technically, Michigan’s statute does require the arresting officer to inform the respondent that his or her actions are 
violating a PPO and give him or her an opportunity to comply with the order, but whether such on-the-spot 
information can possibly qualify as “notice” for constitutional purposes is debatable, especially given the range of 
conduct which the order may enjoin.  See infra, notes 37-39 and accompanying text. 
9 Note, Michigan’s Domestic Violence Laws: A Critique and Proposal for Reform, 42 WAYNE L. REV. 227, 238-39 
(1995). 
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To many individuals involved in the fight against domestic violence, one of the most 
attractive aspects of these orders is that they operate prospectively,10 “explicitly seek[ing] to alter 
the future behavior of the batterer.”11  The problem with this approach to dealing with the 
vexatious and pervasive issue of domestic violence is that by prospectively enjoining otherwise 
legal behavior on the part of respondents (who may never have been convicted of any past 
                                                 
10 David M. Zlotnick, Empowering the Battered Woman: The Use of Criminal Contempt Sanctions to Enforce Civil 
Protection Orders, 56 OHIO ST. L. J. 1190 (1995) (providing an overview of civil protection orders). 
11 Id. Whether protection orders live up to their promise is another issue entirely.  Although there is considerable 
evidence that protection orders do have some deterrent effect on batterers, they certainly have not proven to be any 
sort of “magic pill.” A study conducted in Baltimore, Maryland, indicates that while 99% of women who filed for a 
protective order appeared in court and received an initial ex parte protective order, 30% of these women did not 
proceed to the second stage of the process which would have finalized these orders. See Jane C. Murphy, Engaging 
the State: The Growing Reliance on Lawyers and Judges to Protect Battered Women, 11 AM. U.J. GENDER SOC. 
POL’Y & L. 499, 508-509 (2003) (examining the findings of the study by Mary Ann Dutton, et al., Ecological Model 
of Battered Women’s Experience Over Time (2002)). 
The reasons for such high “victim drop-out” are manifold, but several characteristics of protection orders in 
most states may help to elucidate some of these reasons.  For one thing, each stage in the protection order process is 
typically initiated by the victim.  By placing the burden squarely on the victim to proceed with each stage of the 
protection order process, it is hardly surprising that there is a substantial rate of “victim drop-out.”  Susan E. 
Bernstein discusses the reasons for “victim drop-out” at length in her Note, Living Under Siege: Do Stalking Laws 
Protect Domestic Violence Victims? 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 525, 539 (1993) (citations omitted):  
First, protection orders place a heavy burden on victims to both obtain and enforce the 
order.  Victim initiation is flawed for a number of reasons.  To begin with, the burden of 
initiation may deter victims who are uncomfortable initiating charges against their current 
or past partner from seeking help at all . . . . Further, a complaint brought by a victim may 
lack credibility because prosecutors and judges may more seriously evaluate claims 
brought by the police than by private complainants.  Finally, if the order is violated and the 
abuser returns to the victim’s home or other forbidden territories, then the burden shifts 
back to the victim to call the police to enforce the order . . . . However, court orders are 
also poorly enforced, and thus often fail to provide protection.  Generally, the police arrest 
offenders for violation of a civil protection order only when there are other charges in 
connection with it, such as destruction of property, disruption of the peace, public 
intoxication, or violent behavior witnessed by a responding officer. 
Victim dropout may be curtailed by mandatory prosecution, but mandatory prosecution is by no means 
universal.  Without successful prosecutions to enforce protection orders, the deterrent effect of such orders must be 
de minimis at best.   
Another serious problem for victims is fear of retribution.  Such fear is by no means unreasonable; at least 
one study found that 10% of women who obtain a protection order are subsequently beaten by their partner in 
retaliation. Kathleen J. Ferraro, Cops, Courts, and Woman Battering, in VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN: THE BLOODY 
FOOTPRINTS 173 (Pauline B. Bart & Eileen G. Moran eds., 1993).  Another recent study indicates that after sixth 
months, 65% of petitioners noted that their partner had not violated the terms of their protection order. See Joan 
Zorza and Nancy K.D. Lemon, Two-Thirds of Civil Protection Orders are Successful; Better Court and Community 
Services Increase their Success Rates, 2(4) DOMESTIC VIOLENCE REPORT 51-52 (April/May 1997).   The study 
“included 285 battered women in Denver, Colorado; Wilmington, Delaware; and Washington, DC.”  The authors of 
this study point to the recidivism rate as a success, but the bottom line is that protection orders aren’t that effective if 
over one-third of the individuals enjoined by such orders disregard them.   
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criminal infractions), and by backing the injunction up with the threat of warrantless arrest from 
the moment such an order is issued (regardless of whether the respondent has yet even received 
notice of the injunction), the ex parte protection order effectuates a politically correct but socially 
disastrous assault on the constitutional rights of the individual enjoined by the order. 
Unfortunately, this concern does not seem to faze the many proponents of personal 
protection orders.  Indeed, one recent commentary boldly demands that the “[p]roperty, custody, 
and due process rights of persons who have jeopardized the physical safety of others should yield 
until an expedited hearing....”12  Taken to its logical end, such an extremist position could 
dispense with the fields of due process and criminal procedure altogether!  Another commentator 
has argued that the immediate, unnoticed enforcement of ex parte protection orders is necessary 
insofar as “[t]he delay between filing requests for protective orders and service of orders left 
victims without the protection of injunctions and vulnerable to further abuse.  In fact, victims 
were most often in danger during this delay period if their batterers were evading service because 
they knew that the victims had filed for injunctive relief.”13  Admittedly, the dangers faced by 
victims of domestic violence between the time that a PPO is issued and the time that notice is 
effectuated are by no means negligible, and any legislative attempt to provide protection to 
victims of domestic violence must take these issues seriously.14  However, concern for victims’ 
                                                 
12 Mary S. Hood & Julie Kunce Field, Domestic Abuse Injunction Law and Practice: Will Michigan Ever Catch Up 
to the Rest of the Country? 73 MICH. B.J. 902, 903-04 (1994) (citing Herrell, S. B. & Hofford, M., Family Violence: 
Improving Court Practice, Reno, NV: National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges at  22 (1990)). 
13 Supra, note 9, at 244  (citing Kit Kinports & Karla Fischer, Orders of Protection in Domestic Violence Cases: An 
Empirical Assessment of the Impact of the Reform Statutes, 2 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 163, 222 (1993)). 
14 See infra, Section III, dealing with PROPOSALS, outlining possible alternatives to the current statutory system. 
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safety must ultimately yield to the constitutional mandates of Due Process and the Warrant 
Clause.15   
This comment explores two distinct constitutional objections to unnoticed ex parte 
protection orders.  The first objection is that due process is offended insofar as the ex parte order 
deprives the respondent of his or her liberty or property interests.  In many cases, this objection 
may be unavailing in light of the U.S. Supreme Court’s due process jurisprudence.16  The weight 
of the government’s interest in protecting victims of domestic violence from their abusers and 
the relative ease with which any procedurally deficient deprivation may be remedied tend to 
vitiate this due process objection in all but the most extreme cases, such as where an ex parte 
PPO ejects an individual from his or her home or place of employment.17  However, in these 
extreme cases, immediate enforcement of the PPO will almost certainly offend the Due Process 
Clause.18  The second objection is that the Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment is offended 
by subjecting an individual to warrantless arrest for conduct which would be completely licit but 
for the existence of the unnoticed19 protection order.  Although many lower courts have upheld 
the constitutionality similar schemes, the best reading of the U.S. Supreme Court’s criminal 
procedural jurisprudence precludes such an expansion of the police powers of the state.  In short, 
immediate enforcement of ex parte protection orders may, depending upon the conduct enjoined, 
violate the Due Process and Warrant Clauses of the United States Constitution.  
                                                 
15 See infra, APPENDIX, detailing proposed legislation. 
16 See, e.g., Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (setting forth the test for determining whether a pre-
hearing deprivation violates due process). 
17 See infra, notes 75-78 and accompanying text. 
18 See infra, Section II(A)(2). 
19 By ‘unnoticed,’ I mean that the individual enjoined by the protection order does not have notice, either actual or 
constructive, of the order.   
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I. HISTORICAL AND LEGAL BACKGROUND 
The immediate enforceability of ex parte protection orders is a relatively new 
development in Michigan’s domestic violence law.   For many years, Michigan law provided that 
violators of “certain injunctions against domestic abuse . . . would be subject to warrantless arrest 
and criminal contempt sanctions.”20  However, these injunctions could only be issued against an 
individual’s “spouse, a former spouse, an individual with whom [the petitioner had] a child in 
common, or an individual residing or having resided in the same household.”21  Furthermore, the 
orders could only enjoin a respondent from entry onto the premises of the petitioner, assaultive 
behavior, and unauthorized removal of the minor children from the legal custodian.22  Most 
importantly, these injunctions were ineffective until they were served on the respondent. 
Prior to the enactment of Michigan’s domestic relations personal protection order statute, 
“incidents of domestic abuse reported by law enforcement agencies increased 54% between 1989 
and 1992.”23  There was a growing consensus that Michigan was falling behind other states in 
terms of the legal protections offered to victims of domestic violence.24  In 1994, recognizing the 
need for action, the Michigan legislature created “domestic relationship personal protection 
orders”25 and “non-domestic stalking personal protection orders”26 in order to provide 
individuals with a civil injunctive remedy for domestic violence and stalking.27   
                                                 
20 Michigan Judicial Institute, MICHIGAN DOMESTIC VIOLENCE BENCHBOOK 247 (2004). 
21 MCLA 600.2950(1) (West 1984). 
22 MCLA 600.2950 (West 1984). 
23 See Hood, supra, note 12, at 902 (citing Michigan State Police, Uniform Crime Reporting Division: 1992 
Figures). 
24 See generally id. 
25 MCLA 600.2950(1). 
26 MCLA 600.2950a(1). 
27 BENCHBOOK, supra, note 20, at 245 (2004). 
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The 1994 PPO statutes simplified the process by which injunctive relief is sought.   
Under the new system, judges must rule on requests for ex parte PPOs within 24 hours of their 
filing.28  Moreover, a judge’s denial of a PPO request must be in writing and include specific 
reasons for the denial.29  State law also requires the courts to provide free forms and filing for 
PPO petitions.30    
The 1994 statute also expanded the scope of individuals who may petition for civil 
injunctive relief.  The new statute included individuals engaged in “frequent, intimate 
associations primarily characterized by the expectation of affectional involvement” within its 
purview. 31  In other words, along with individuals who are married, cohabiting, or have a child 
in common, domestic violence personal protection orders could now be sought by individuals in 
a “dating relationship.”  Furthermore, the legislature’s concurrent creation of non-domestic 
stalking personal protection orders expanded civil injunctive relief, albeit of a more limited type, 
to cover any individual who has been the victim of stalking.32 
The new statute also expands the types of conduct which may be enjoined by court order.  
Domestic relations personal protection orders are now capable of enjoining a wide range of 
behaviors, both legal and illegal, such as: 
(a) Entering onto premises. 
                                                 
28 MCR 3.705(A)(1). 
29 MCLA 600.2950(7); MCLA 600.2950a(4). 
30 MCLA 600.2529(1)(a). 
31 MCLA 600.2950(30)(a).  Individuals engaged in divorce proceedings must seek protective orders under MCLA 
552.14, which is beyond the scope of this paper. There are also several important categories of people who are 
specifically excluded from the scope of domestic violence personal protection orders: parents are precluded from 
taking out a protection order against their unemancipated minor children, 600.2950(27)(a); unemancipated minor 
children are precluded from taking out a protection order against their parents, 600.2950(27)(b); and protection 
orders cannot be issued against anyone under ten years old, 600.2950(27)(c).  The same exclusions apply in the case 
of stalking personal protection orders, MCLA 600.2950a(25)(a)-(c), with the additional category of “prisoners” 
excluded from the coverage of the stalking PPO statute, MCLA 600.2950a(28).  
32 See generally MCLA 600.2950a.  Non-domestic anti-stalking PPOs are not the subject of this Comment, and 
references to PPOs and ex parte orders should be understood to refer to domestic relations PPOs unless otherwise 
noted. 
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(b) Assaulting, attacking, beating, molesting, or wounding a named 
individual. 
(c) Threatening to kill or physically injure a named individual. 
(d) Removing minor children from the individual having legal custody of 
the children, except as otherwise authorized by a custody or parenting 
time order issued by a court of competent jurisdiction. 
(e) Purchasing or possessing a firearm. 
(f) Interfering with petitioner’s efforts to remove petitioner’s children or 
personal property from premises that are solely owned or leased by the 
individual to be restrained or enjoined. 
(g) Interfering with petitioner at petitioner’s place of employment or 
education or engaging in conduct that impairs a petitioner’s employment 
or educational relationship or environment. 
(h) Having access to information in records concerning a minor child of 
both petitioner and respondent that will inform respondent about the 
address or telephone number of petitioner and petitioner’s minor child 
or about petitioner’s minor child or about petitioner’s employment 
address. 
(i) Engaging in conduct that is prohibited under section 411h or 411i of the 
Michigan penal code, 1931 PA 328, MCL 750.411h and 750.411i. 
(j) Any other specific act or conduct that imposes on or interferes with 
personal liberty or that causes a reasonable apprehension of violence.33 
 
Non-domestic stalking personal protection orders are more limited in scope, and may only enjoin 
stalking and aggravated stalking, as defined in MCLA 750.411h. 
While the aforementioned aspects of Michigan’s personal protection order statutes serve 
as powerful weapons in the fight against domestic violence, the statute also provides that “[a] 
personal protection order is effective and immediately enforceable anywhere in this state when 
signed by a judge.”34  Michigan’s domestic relationship personal protection order statute requires 
the court to issue the immediately effective ex parte order as long as certain minimal statutory 
requirements are met.  Specifically, MCLA 600.2950(12) provides that: 
An ex parte personal protection order shall be issued and effective without 
written or oral notice to the individual restrained or enjoined or his or her 
attorney if it clearly appears from specific facts shown by verified 
complaint, written motion, or affidavit that immediate and irreparable 
injury, loss, or damage will result from the delay required to effectuate 
                                                 
33 MCLA 600.2950(1)(a)-(j). 
34 MCLA 600.2950(9). 
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notice or that notice will itself precipitate adverse action before a personal 
protection order can be issued.35 
 
 The only “notice” that is required in order to arrest an individual for a PPO violation is 
provided by the arresting officer.36  Prior to taking an individual into custody, the officer must 
inform the individual that his or her conduct has been enjoined by an ex parte protection order 
and that the individual can only avoid arrest by immediate compliance with the protection 
order.37  Given the fact that the conduct enjoined by the order may be legal38 (if not 
constitutionally protected) in the absence of the order, requiring such compliance on the basis of 
the on-site admonition of a police officer is patently unreasonable. 
 
II. ANALYSIS 
Procedural due process generally requires, at the very least, that an individual receive 
notice and an opportunity to be heard in order for the state to deprive him or her of “life, liberty 
                                                 
35 MCLA 600.2950(12).  MCLA 600.2950a(9) deals with immediately effective ex parte stalking personal 
protection orders: 
An ex parte personal protection order shall not be issued and effective without written or 
oral notice to the individual enjoined or his or her attorney unless it clearly appears from 
specific facts shown by verified complaint, written motion, or affidavit that immediate and 
irreparable injury, loss or damage will result from the delay required to effectuate notice or 
that the notice will itself precipitate adverse action before a personal protection order can 
be issued. 
In essence, the only difference between the two statutes consists in the use of the phrase “shall issue” in MCLA 
600.2950(12), whereas MCLA 600.2950a(9) uses the phrase “shall not issue.” As such, there is no requirement that 
the court issue an ex parte PPO in a stalking case, leaving the matter up to judicial discretion.  See, e.g., 
BENCHBOOK, supra, note 20 at 261. 
36 Notice of the protection order is required by the statute, see MCLA 600.2950(18), but the order is enforceable 
prior to the effectuation of notice.  See MCLA 600.2950(12). 
37 Specifically, MCLA 600.2950(22): 
If the individual restrained or enjoined has not received notice of the personal protection 
order, the individual restrained or enjoined shall be given an opportunity to comply with 
the personal protection order before the law enforcement officer makes a custodial arrest 
for violation of the personal protection order. The failure to immediately comply with the 
personal protection order shall be grounds for an immediate custodial arrest.   
38 See generally MCLA 600.2950(1)(a)—(j), describing the types of conduct that may be enjoined by a domestic 
relations protection order. 
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or property.”39  Exactly what process is required, though, is a much more nuanced question.  The 
Supreme Court has noted that due process “is a flexible concept—[and] the process required by 
the clause with respect to termination of a protected interest will vary depending upon the 
importance attached to the interest and the particular circumstances under which the deprivation 
may occur.”40  
 
 A. Due Process Clause Concerns with Ex Parte Protection Orders  
1. Interests Subject to Deprivation by Ex Parte Orders  
The due process issue raised by ex parte protection orders concerns the temporary 
deprivation of liberty and property interests which may be effectuated through the immediate 
enforceability of an unnoticed protection order.  As a preliminary matter, however, it is 
necessary to establish that an individual who has been enjoined by a protection order has a 
liberty or property interest at stake.41  
In fact, there are numerous ways in which an ex parte protection order may lead to a 
deprivation of an individual’s liberty and property interests, since ex parte protection orders may 
enjoin a wide range of behaviors.42  For example, a personal protection order may enjoin the 
respondent from being within a certain distance of the petitioner.43  Such an order would 
effectively bar the respondent from unwittingly walking down the same street as the petitioner, 
                                                 
39 U.S. CONST., Amend. XIV., sec. 1; and see, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (finding welfare benefits 
to qualify as a property interest); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (students have may have a property interest in 
their education, entitling them to due process, based on the state’s creation of such an entitlement to education); but 
see, e.g., Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972) (finding an untenured professor did not have either a liberty 
or property interest in the job from which he was terminated). 
40 Walters v. National Association of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 320 (1985). 
41 It should be apparent that the enforcement of ex parte personal protection orders does not actually deprive an 
individual of life itself. 
42 See supra, note 33 and accompanying text. 
43 This form of injunctive relief is not specifically mentioned in MCLA 600.2950(1), but falls under the catch-all 
provision of MCLA 600.2950(1)(j), which permits the court to enjoin “[a]ny other specific act or conduct that imposes on 
or interferes with personal liberty or that causes a reasonable apprehension of violence.”  
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clearly implicating the respondent’s liberty interest in freedom of movement.44  PPO injunctions 
against interfering with a petitioner at his or her place of employment or education45 implicate 
the liberty interests of the respondent by prohibiting him or her from visiting these locales, 
particularly if the respondent works or studies at the same locations.  If a PPO enjoins a 
respondent from possessing firearms,46 the respondent is subject to a deprivation of both the 
property interests in any firearms he or she already owns, along with the liberty interest in 
possessing firearms in the first place.47  Furthermore, a PPO may cause a respondent to suffer a 
deprivation of the liberty interest in his or her reputation as long as other substantive 
constitutional rights are implicated by the injunction.48   
Finally, and perhaps most significantly, an ex parte order may implicate an individual’s 
liberty and property interests by forcing the respondent to vacate his or her own home when the 
PPO petitioner shares a domicile with the respondent.49   A PPO which prohibits respondent’s 
                                                 
44 Cf., e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (holding  state statutes denying welfare to individuals who 
had not resided in the state for a set time unconstitutional due to their impermissible interference with the right to 
travel). 
45 See MCLA 600.2950(1)(g). 
46 See MCLA 600.2950(1)(e). 
47 The Second Amendment has not been incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment, and as such is not 
applicable to the states.  See, e.g., Miller v. Texas, 153 U.S. 535, 538 (1894).   The Michigan Constitution, however, 
guarantees “[e]very person . . . a right to keep and bear arms for the defense of himself and the state.”  MICHIGAN 
CONST. 1963, art. 1, § 6.  But see Kampf v. Kampf, 237 Mich.App. 377, 382-83, 603 N.W.2d 295 (1999) (finding 
that this state constitutional right is not offended when a PPO eliminates a respondent’s right to keep and bear arms 
for use in “hunting or other sporting events”). 
48 See Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437 (1971) (holding that reputational harms may constitute a 
deprivation of one’s liberty interests: “[w]here a person's good name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake because 
of what the government is doing to him, notice and an opportunity to be heard are essential”); and see Paul v. Davis, 424 
U.S. 693 (1976). In Paul, the Court announced that reputational harms may impact upon an individual’s liberty 
interests only when,  
as a result of the state action complained of, a right or status previously recognized by state law 
was distinctly altered or extinguished. It [is] this alteration, officially removing the interest from 
the recognition and protection previously afforded by the State, which . . . [is] sufficient to 
invoke the procedural guarantees contained in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. But the interest in reputation alone which respondent seeks to vindicate in this 
action in federal court is quite different from the "liberty" or "property" recognized in those 
decisions.   
Id. at 711. 
49 In some states, such strategic use of PPOs is especially common in divorce cases, although Michigan law 
specifically excludes individuals engaged in divorce proceedings from seeking PPO protection against each other 
 13
“entry onto premises”50 thus deprives the respondent of his or her real property rights in the 
home itself and his or her personal property rights in any belongings contained therein.   
Still greater infringements on liberty and property interests are possible insofar as a PPO 
contains incorrect information or is misunderstood by the police officers on the scene.  Consider 
the following scenario: the PPO petitioner travels from her house to respondent’s house, calls the 
police, and has him arrested for violating the PPO which, on its face, enjoins him from being 
present in his own house!  Unfortunately, this scenario is no mere hypothetical; such a 
deprivation occurred in the Michigan Court of Appeal’s case of People v. Freeman.51  
Michigan’s PPO statute specifically provides that an individual who is not married to the PPO 
petitioner may not be restrained from entering premises in which he or she has a property interest 
if the petitioner has no property interest in the same property.52  However, the information 
contained in the PPO in the Freeman case was inaccurate and misleading, and the police officers 
responding to the petitioner’s call “reasonably believed” that the petitioner/defendant was 
violating the protection order.  Inexplicably, the defendant did not raise the PPO as an issue in 
the case, which ultimately turned on his evasion of arrest by the responding officers.53  The Court 
                                                                                                                                                             
(Although individuals in the process of divorce can still get a protective order against their spouse under MCLA 
552.14).  One commentator has noted that “[t]he minimal threshold of assault or threat of assault necessary to obtain 
a protective order without committing perjury can, unfortunately, be satisfied at some point by almost anyone 
undergoing even a relatively amicable divorce.” Randy Frances Kandel, Squabbling in the Shadows: What the Law 
Can Learn from the Way Divorcing Couples Use Protective Orders as Bargaining Chips in Domestic Spats and 
Child Custody Mediation, 48 S.C.L. REV. 441, 448 (1997).  An inescapable, and disconcerting, fact is that  
[a]llegations of abuse are often used as an offensive first weapon in a divorce case.  In most 
states, the mere allegation of abuse will trigger an immediate ex-parte order to put the 
alleged perpetrator out of the house, granting effective custody and control of both the 
marital residence and the children to the victim.  Unfortunately, even in the case of false 
allegations, the “horse is already out of the barn,” and the courts are slow to reverse their 
orders.   
Barbara Salomon, Guilty Until Proven Innocent: Representing the Alleged Abuser, 17-WTR 
FAM. ADVOC. 30, 31-32 (1995). 
50 See MCLA 600.2950(1)(a). 
51 240 Mich.App. 235 (2000). 
52 MCLA 600.2950(5).  
53 The Defendant attempted to flee from the respondent officers.  Freeman, 240 Mich.App. at 235-36. 
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found that the officers who arrested the defendant had a reasonable suspicion that he was guilty 
of violating the PPO, and the Court held that his arrest was valid.  However, the Court expressed 
concern that careless drafting of PPOs could lead to more mistakes, ultimately undermining the 
public’s “trust” in the PPO system.54   Such concern is by no means unfounded, and Freeman 
exemplifies the dangers inherent in the enforcement of unnoticed ex parte orders.55 
    
2. The Time and Nature of Due Process Hearings  
Having established that there are numerous instances in which a domestic relationship 
personal protection order may cause a deprivation of the respondent’s liberty or property 
interests, the relevant inquiry becomes: (1) what type of hearing is required, and (2) when must 
the requisite hearing be held.  The seminal case on the issue of due process hearings in the civil 
context is Matthews v. Eldridge,56 in which the U.S. Supreme Court announced a balancing test 
for determining when a hearing is required in a civil case.  In determining the constitutional 
permissibility of a deprivation of a liberty or property interest in the civil context, one must 
                                                 
54 Id. at 237, fn. 1 (emphasis added): 
Although the personal protection order itself is not at issue in this case, we express our 
concern raised by the facts of this case. This case illustrates the need to draft such orders 
carefully in order to avoid inconsistencies and confusion. Here, for example, the 
complainant's residence is listed in the body of the order as 38 N. Riviera Drive. The 
caption of the order, however, states that the complainant can be reached at 1419 Capital 
Avenue, # 32. The complainant was at defendant's address at 1419 Capital Avenue, # 32, 
when defendant was arrested for violating the order. Surely, a defendant must question the 
wisdom of an order that makes it a violation of a court order to be in his own home, 
particularly when the complainant has a separate residence and makes the complaint to 
the police while at the defendant's residence. This would appear to allow personal 
protection order to be used as a sword rather than a shield, contrary to the intent of the 
legislation that was quite properly designed and intended to protect spouses and others 
from predators. When personal protection orders are allowed to be misused because of 
careless wording or otherwise, then the law is correspondingly undermined because it loses 
the respect of citizens that is important to the effective operation of our justice system. 
55 Another concern, not specifically addressed by the Court of Appeals, is that the general atmosphere created by 
personal protection orders will itself lead police to err on the side of arresting anyone they suspect may be guilty of a 
PPO violation.  Such over-zealous police work, while ostensibly effectuating the purposes of the PPO statute, 
certainly raises concerns under the Warrant Clause.  See infra, Section C. 
56 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
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consider “the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of 
erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if 
any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the government’s interest, 
including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or 
substitute procedural requirements would entail.”57 
Prior to its decision in Matthews v. Eldridge, the Supreme Court addressed the 
constitutionality of ex parte orders which work a deprivation of a property interest in the case of 
Fuentes v. Shevin.58  In Fuentes, the Court was faced with the issue of whether state statutes 
which provided for the seizure of an individual’s possessions upon the ex parte application of 
“any other person who claims a right to them and posts a security bond” offends due process 
when “[n]either statute provides for notice to be given to the possessor of the property, and 
neither statute provides gives the possessor an opportunity to challenge the seizure at any kind of 
prior hearing.”59 The Court recognized that while both statutes provided for post-deprivation 
hearings, such hearings are insufficient to satisfy due process; indeed, the Court held that “[i]f 
the right to notice and a hearing is to serve its full purpose, then it is clear that it must be granted 
at a time when deprivation can still be prevented.”60 
This case, however, represented a “high water mark” of procedural requirements in the 
case of deprivation of property interests.  Shortly thereafter, the Court addressed the 
                                                 
57 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
58 407 U.S. 67 (1972). 
59 Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 70 (1972). 
60 Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 81.  The general proposition that “individuals must receive notice and an opportunity to be 
heard before the Government deprives them of property,” United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 
U.S. 43, 48 (1993) (citations omitted), has been established by various other Supreme Court cases as well.  See, e.g., 
United States v. $8,850, 461 U.S. 555, 562, n. 12 (1983); Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp. of Bay View, 395 U.S. 
337, 342  (1962) (Harlan, J., concurring); and  Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 
(1950). 
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constitutionality of a similar replevin statute in Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Company.61  In this case, 
however, the Court distinguished Fuentes since the statute at issue in Mitchell required that “the 
requisite showing [in the ex parte hearing] . . . be made to a judge, and judicial authorization 
obtained.”62  Furthermore, the statute at issue in Mitchell required a very narrow inquiry into 
whether there was a vendor’s lien and whether there’s been a default, as opposed to the statutes 
at issue in Fuentes, which required a broader and more fact-intensive determination that the 
debtor was “at fault.”  As such, the Court found that this statute posed “far less danger that the 
seizure will be mistaken and a corresponding decrease in the utility of an adversary hearing 
which will be immediately available in any event.”63 
Since the Matthews decision, the Court has distinguished between seizures of moveable 
property and seizures of real property.  Since an ex parte protection order effectively ejecting an 
individual from his home constitutes a seizure of real property,64 this distinction is relevant to 
this due process analysis.  In United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property,65 the Court 
found that the seizure of forfeitable real property through ex parte proceedings “cannot be 
classified as de minimis for purposes of procedural due process[;] . . . the private interests at 
stake in the seizure of real property weigh heavily in the Matthews balance.”66  As such, the 
government must establish that exigent circumstances justify an ex parte seizure of real property, 
“show[ing] that less restrictive measures [than seizure]—i.e., a lis pendens, restraining order, or 
bond—would not suffice to protect the Government's interests in preventing the sale, destruction, 
or continued unlawful use of the real property.”67  Absent the establishment of clear exigencies, 
                                                 
61 416 U.S. 600 (1974). 
62 Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Company, 416 U.S. 600, 616 (1974). 
63 Mitchell, 416 at 618. 
64 See supra, notes 49-50 and accompanying text. 
65 510 U.S. 43 (1993). 
66 United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U.S. 43, 54-55 (1993). 
67 James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U.S. at 62. 
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an ex parte hearing before a magistrate judge does not suffice to bring such seizures within the 
realm of constitutional permissibility.68   
In Connecticut v. Doehr,69 the Supreme Court examined a Connecticut statute that 
“authorize[d] prejudgment attachment of real estate without prior notice or hearing, without a 
showing of extraordinary circumstances, and without a requirement that the person seeking the 
attachment post a bond . . .”70 The Court found that such a statute does not satisfy the minimum 
demands of due process.71  While this case is clearly distinguishable from the issuance of ex 
parte protection orders, which arguably require the establishment of “extraordinary 
circumstances”72 and are at least reviewed by a judge,73 the Court’s discussion of the due process 
clause is enlightening.  The Court acknowledges that the effects of Connecticut’s statute “do not 
amount to complete, physical, or permanent deprivation of real property,” but “even the 
temporary or partial impairment to property rights that attachments, liens, and similar 
encumbrances entail are sufficient to merit due process protection.”74  By analogy, the much 
more serious deprivations wrought by ex parte protection orders must require significant 
exigencies in order to “pass constitutional muster.” 
In essence, this line of cases indicates that, absent sufficient exigent circumstances, a 
deprivation of one’s interest in real property, even though temporary, violates the due process 
clause when such a deprivation has occurred without notice and an opportunity to be heard.75  
Therefore, in the case of an individual’s ejection from his home by virtue of an unnoticed ex 
parte order, the individual’s interests at stake in the home weigh heavily in the Matthews 
                                                 
68 See generally id. 
69 501 U.S. 1 (1991). 
70 Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1, 4 (1991). 
71 Doehr, 501 U.S. at 24. 
72 See supra, note 35 and accompanying text. 
73 See supra, note 34 and accompanying text. 
74 Doehr, 501 U.S. at 12. 
75 See James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U.S. at 62. 
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balance.76  However, the oft-asserted weight of the state’s interest in protecting victims of 
domestic violence from their abusers could very easily trump such concerns in when the 
government’s interference with a private interest is less extreme or the underlying private interest 
is less important.77  Ultimately, the issue of whether enforcement of an ex parte PPO violates due 
process must be analyzed on a case-by-case basis, paying attention to the Matthews factors.  An 
order enjoining illegal or harassing conduct will almost certainly survive the Matthews test, 
while on the other extreme, an ex parte order evicting a respondent from a shared home is almost 
certainly unconstitutional, at least without additional procedural safeguards.78 
 
3. Lower Court Decisions Regarding Deprivations Through Ex Parte Orders  
Although the Supreme Court has never directly addressed the issue, many lower courts 
have rejected the argument that ex parte protection orders offend due process.79  This is generally 
due to the fact that the state is seen as having a compelling state interest in combating domestic 
violence which outweighs the respondent’s property interests.  For example, in Boyle v. Boyle,80 
the defendant claimed that an ex parte protective order barring him from his house and children 
                                                 
76 See, e.g., supra, notes 56-57 and accompanying text. 
77 Cf. id. 
78 See infra, Section III.   
79 See, e.g., Mary Schouvelieller, Leaping Without Looking: Chapter 142’s Impact on Ex Parte Protection Orders 
and the Movement Against Domestic Violence in Minnesota, 14 LAW & INEQ. 593, 613 Fn. 103 (1996): 
Although no United States Supreme Court case directly addresses ex parte civil protection 
orders, a number of courts have addressed and rejected claims that such orders violate due 
process in domestic abuse cases.  See Blazel v. Bradley, 698 F. Supp. 756, 768 (W.D. Wis. 
1998) (holding that ex parte orders do not violate due process generally but do if the order 
was wrongly issued); State ex rel. Williams v. Marsh, 626 S.W.2d 223, 229-32 (Mo. 1982) 
(upholding the Missouri Adult Abuse Act’s provision for temporary ex parte relief); 
Marquette v. Marquette, 686 P.2d 990, 995-96 (Okl. Ct. App. 1984) (upholding restrictions 
on respondent’s visitation with his children because the procedural safeguards, which 
provided for a hearing within ten days, supplied adequate due process); Boyle v. Boyle, 12 
Pa. D & C.3d. 767 (1979) (finding that Pennsylvania’s Protection From Abuse Act, which 
provided for the ex parte eviction of respondent, was constitutional); Shramek v. Borhen, 
429 N.W.2d 501, 504-06 (Wis. Ct. App. 1988) (rejecting respondent’s claim that the notice 
provided him was insufficient) . . . [H]owever, all of these cases, with the exception of 
Blazel, addressed temporary ex parte relief  in cases of immediate threat of violence. 
80 12 Pa.D & C.3d 767 (1979). 
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unconstitutionally deprived him of liberty and property without due process of law.  The 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court rejected this argument, holding that the “government’s interest in 
protecting its citizens outweighed the individual’s Fourteenth Amendment due process rights.”81   
Several other state courts have relied on the temporary nature of protection orders in 
upholding their constitutionality.  In Minnesota, for instance, ex parte orders are “temporary and 
limited to situations involving an ‘immediate threat of violence.’”82  As such, ex parte orders 
may be enforced without notice “in extraordinary circumstances where the risk of injury is 
plain.”83 
The Michigan Court of Appeals upheld the constitutionality of ex parte PPOs in Kampf v. 
Kampf.84  In Kampf, the Respondent’s wife obtained a personal protection order enjoining him 
from entering the premises of her home and work, assaulting, stalking and threatening her, 
contacting her by telephone, and purchasing or possessing a firearm.85  Respondent argued that 
the personal protection order statute pursuant to which this order was issued “violates the due 
process guarantee of notice and an opportunity to be heard.”86  The Court rejected Respondent’s 
argument, holding that “[t]here is no procedural due process defect in obtaining an emergency 
order of protection without notice to a respondent when the petition for the emergency order is 
supported by affidavits that demonstrate exigent circumstances justifying entry of an emergency 
order without prior notice and where there are appropriate provisions for notice and an 
opportunity to be heard after the order is issued.”87   
                                                 
81 Boyle v. Boyle, 12 Pa.D & C.3d 767, 774. 
82 Mary Schouvelieller, Leaping Without Looking: Chapter 142’s Impact on Ex Parte Protection Orders and the 
Movement Against Domestic Violence in Minnesota, 14 LAW & INEQ. 593, 612 (1996) (citing Baker v. Baker, 494 
N.W.2d 282 (Minn. 1992)).   
83 Baker v. Baker, 494 N.W.2d at 287. 
84 603 N.W.2d 295 (1999). 
85 Kampf v. Kampf, 603 N.W.2d 295, 297(1999). 
86 Kampf, 603 N.W.2d at 299 (internal citations omitted). 
87 Kampf, 603 N.W.2d at 299 (internal citations omitted). 
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When considered in conjunction with the Supreme Court’s decisions regarding due 
process, the results reached by lower courts seem untenable.88  Although ex parte orders may 
frequently satisfy the minimum requirements of due process, there are situations where an ex 
parte order “crosses the line” and offends due process.  As already noted, due process requires an 
inquiry into the various interests at stake, the risk of erroneous deprivation of those interests, and 
the burden on the government in providing additional process.89  Once these variables have been 
identified, it is necessary to balance them against each other.90  While balancing these variables 
is not an exact science,91 many state court decisions upholding the validity of ex parte orders 
seem to forgo their comparison altogether.92  Despite the best intentions of these courts, 
however, the categorical assertion that the state has a compelling interest in combating domestic 
violence93 is a patently insufficient justification for abrogating the protections afforded by the 
Due Process Clause.  
  
C. Constitutional Dimensions of Warrantless Arrests Pursuant to Unnoticed Ex 
Parte PPOs 
1. Overview of the Warrant Clause 
 Another troubling aspect of ex parte protection orders becomes evident when a 
respondent is arrested for violating an order of which he or she had no knowledge whatsoever.  
The respondent’s actions may violate no laws, but he or she may nevertheless be subject to a 
warrantless arrest for contempt for disobeying a protection order.  Arrest clearly works a 
                                                 
88 See supra, notes 56-78 and accompanying text. 
89 Matthews, 424 U.S. at 335. 
90 Id. 
91 See supra, note 40 and accompanying text. 
92 See, e.g., notes 79-80. 
93 Cf., e.g., Boyle, 12 Pa.D & C.3d at 774. 
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deprivation of an individual’s liberty interests, and procedural due process applies.  Freedom 
from physical restraint “has always been at the core of the liberty protected by the Due Process 
Clause from arbitrary government action.”94  This is true whether the physical restraint is the 
result of civil or criminal proceedings.  It is well established that “if confinement is to rest on a 
theory of civil contempt, . . . due process requires a hearing to determine whether petitioner has 
in fact behaved in a manner that amounts to contempt.”95  However, along with due process 
concerns, warrantless arrest on the basis of unnoticed ex parte orders also implicates the interest 
in personal liberty which is protected by the Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment. 
As a preliminary matter, it is necessary to acknowledge that warrants and ex parte 
protection orders, while analogous in some ways,96 are analytically distinguishable.97  However, 
when the result of either a warrant or an ex parte protection order is that an individual is taken 
into police custody, this distinction is without substance.  
Supreme Court jurisprudence has long established that no warrant is required in order to 
arrest an individual whom police reasonably believe is guilty of a felony.98  It is also permissible 
to arrest an individual for a misdemeanor, even if the underlying offense is not punishable by 
jail-time,99 as long as the offense was committed in the presence of the police officer.100  
                                                 
94 Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992). 
95 McNeil v. Director, Patuxent Institution, 407 U.S. 245, 251 (1972). 
96 See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Terry and Fourth Amendment First Principles, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1097, 1117 
(1998). Mr. Amar opines that “[b]ecause warrants at the founding issued ex parte, and pre-empted the possibility of 
various after-the-fact opportunities for judicial review of the search, warrants were carefully hedged by certain 
limitations that did not apply to warrantless action. By analogy, temporary restraining orders (TROs), because they 
issue ex parte, are hedged by certain limitations that do not apply outside the TRO context.” 
97 The primary difference is that the ex parte order does not actually permit the police to arrest the individual 
enjoined.  Rather, it simply provides that the individual may be arrested, without a warrant, for violating the terms of 
the order.  But see infra, Sec. II(C)(2)(b) (discussing anticipatory warrants, which may operate in a manner that is 
very similar—although not identical—to  PPOs in this regard). 
98 United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976) (in which the Supreme Court held that the warrantless arrest of an 
individual suspected of mail fraud, a felony, in a public place pursuant to the tip of a reliable informant was 
constitutionally permissible). 
99 Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354 (2001) (establishing that “the standard of probable cause ‘applie[s] 
to all arrests, without the need to 'balance' the interests and circumstances involved in particular situations.’ If an officer 
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However, it is impermissible to effectuate the warrantless arrest of a suspect in his home absent 
exigent circumstances,101 and the Supreme Court has “emphasized that ‘at the very core’ of the 
Fourth Amendment ‘stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home.’”102  Thus, absent 
some exigency, officers would not have a right to enter the home of a respondent who violates a 
PPO enjoining entry into his or her home.   Moreover, the Supreme Court has never actually 
acknowledged the validity of warrantless arrests of individuals whom an officer reasonably 
believes to have committed a misdemeanor outside of the arresting officer’s presence.103  
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has never considered whether an individual may be arrested for 
violating a court order of which he had no notice.104  As such, an arrest for a violation of a PPO 
which occurred outside of the officer’s presence may be unconstitutional under the Fourth 
Amendment. Given the relevant precedent, the question proponents of ex parte protection orders 
must contend with is whether an arrest based upon the violation of an unnoticed personal 
protection order can possibly comport with the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on the issue of 
warrantless arrests.  
                                                                                                                                                             
has probable cause to believe that an individual has committed even a very minor criminal offense in his presence, he may, 
without violating the Fourth Amendment, arrest the offender.” (citation omitted). 
100 Watson, 423 U.S. at 418 (discussing the continuing applicability of “the ancient common-law rule that a peace 
officer was permitted to arrest without a warrant for a misdemeanor or felony committed in his presence as well as for a 
felony not committed in his presence if there was reasonable ground for making the arrest”(citations omitted)).   
101 See generally Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980) (holding that a warrant is required to enter a suspect’s 
home for the purpose of arresting him, absent exigent circumstances). 
102 Soldal v. Cook County, Ill., 506 U.S. 56, 61 (1992) (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 
(1961)). 
103 Cf. generally Atwater, 523 U.S. 318.  The Supreme Court has generally interpreted the Fourth Amendment in 
light of the prevailing common law rules in effect at the time the Amendment was enacted.  Under the common law, 
police could generally not arrest for misdemeanors without a warrant, with a narrow exception carved out allowing 
officers to arrest for breach of the peace.  See id. at 353.  The Atwater Court clearly goes against the common law 
rule, but the holding should arguably be confined to the narrow facts of the case, in which the misdemeanor traffic 
offense which led to Ms. Atwater’s arrest was committed in the presence of the arresting officer.  However, there is 
some authority suggesting that the states may have the power to permit the warrantless arrest of an individual 
suspected of having committed a misdemeanor outside of the officer’s presence.  See, e.g., Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 
U.S. 740, 756 (1984) (White, J., dissenting) (“we have never held that a warrant is constitutionally required to arrest 
for nonfelony offenses occurring out of the officer's presence. Thus, ‘it is generally recognized today that the 
common law authority to arrest without a warrant in misdemeanor cases may be enlarged by statute, and this has 
been done in many of the states.’” (quoting E. FISHER, LAWS OF ARREST 130 (1967); other citations omitted)).  
104 See supra note 103. 
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2. Possible Justifications for Warrantless Arrests of Violators of Unnoticed Ex 
Parte PPOs 
a. Exigent Circumstances 
The first possible justification for the warrantless arrest of alleged violators of personal 
protection orders, in light of the Supreme Court’s Warrant Clause jurisprudence, is that there 
exist exigent circumstances which bring the arrest within the fold of constitutional 
permissibility.105  As attractive as this argument is, it is ultimately without merit.  One reason for 
this is the fact that “exigency only excuses a warrant and not probable cause.”106  Therefore, “the 
police must have both probable cause to believe that a crime had occurred or was occurring as 
well as a reasonable belief that exigency existed….”107  Thus, in order to even come within the 
purview of the exigency exception to the warrant clause, one must first have probable cause to 
believe that an underlying offense is being committed.   
Michigan’s ex parte protection orders, on the other hand, may issue as long as there is 
“reasonable cause to believe that the individual to be restrained or enjoined may commit 1 or 
more of the acts listed in [M.C.L. 600.2950](1).”108  However, the protection order may enjoin 
any of the conduct listed in M.C.L. 600.2950(1).109  For example, even if there is no reasonable 
cause to believe that an individual is likely to attack or molest the petitioner,110 he may be 
enjoined from doing so if there is a reasonable likelihood that he possesses a firearm.111  In other 
words, if the requirements for obtaining a protection order were applied to arrest warrants, an 
                                                 
105 See supra, note 103 and accompanying text. 
106 Kapila Juthani, Note, Police Treatment of Domestic Violence and Sexual Abuse: Affirmative Duty to Protect vs. 
Fourth Amendment Privacy, 59 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 51, 81-82 (2003). 
107 See supra, Juthani at 82. 
108 MCLA 600.2950(4) (emphasis added). 
109 See MCLA 600.2950(1). 
110 See MCLA 600.2950(1)(b). 
111 MCLA 600.2950(1)(e). 
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anticipatory arrest warrant could issue conditioned upon the suspect engaging in legal act #1 
based on probable cause that the suspect will engage in legal act #2!  Since ex parte protection 
orders do not necessarily require probable cause that an individual has committed or is 
committing a criminal offense in order to be enforceable,112 the standard of “exigency” which 
applies in the context of the warrant clause does not necessarily even come into play. 
Furthermore, even if an ex parte protection order is supported by probable cause and a 
reasonable suspicion of exigent circumstances,113 the order may still be constitutionally defective 
insofar as it enjoins conduct that is either a misdemeanor offense or a course of conduct which 
would be legal but for the existence of the injunction.  There are no Supreme Court cases which 
apply the “exigent circumstances” exception to the Warrant Clause to the arrest of an individual 
suspected of a misdemeanor infraction or the violation of a civil protective order when that 
individual’s offense occurred outside the presence of the arresting officer.114  Insofar as the 
Supreme Court has addressed this issue at all, it has “conclude[d] that the common-sense 
approach utilized by most lower courts is required by the Fourth Amendment prohibition on 
‘unreasonable searches and seizures,’” and has held “that an important factor to be considered 
when determining whether any exigency exists is the gravity of the underlying offense for which 
the arrest is being made.”115 Quite simply, the very nature of a misdemeanor offense (i.e., an 
offense which is not as serious as a felony) mitigates against its “gravity” for purposes of the 
exigency exception.   
 
                                                 
112 MCLA 600.2950(1) and (4). 
113 See supra, notes 106 and 107 and accompanying text. 
114 I have searched for cases in which the Supreme Court upheld the warrantless arrest of an individual for 
committing a misdemeanor outside the officer’s presence based on exigent circumstances, and have been unable to 
find any case expressly approving such a course of action.  But see supra, note 103. 
115 Welsh, 466 U.S. at 753 (discussing the approaches of the lower courts to the “exigent circumstances” exception 
to the warrant requirement as it relates to entry into a suspect’s home). 
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   b. Anticipatory Warrants 
 Another possible argument in favor of arresting violators of unnoticed, ex parte 
protection orders, is that the PPO itself effectively serves as a conditional warrant.  This is an 
attractive argument, given the fact that courts in the majority of U.S. states have upheld the 
constitutionality of “anticipatory warrants,” provided that the conditions triggering these 
warrants are explicit.116  Whether such warrants are actually valid is still an open question since 
the Supreme Court has never addressed the issue.  However, assuming that such anticipatory 
warrants do in fact comport with the due process clause, they are readily distinguishable from the 
warrantless arrest of an individual based upon violation of an unnoticed personal protection 
order.   
First of all, anticipatory warrants require a particularized description of the specific 
conditions which trigger the warrant.  Furthermore, there must be probable cause to believe that 
these conditions will occur prior to the issuance of the warrant.    The Second Circuit provides a 
good discussion of the various requirements for a constitutionally-sound anticipatory warrant in 
United States v. Garcia.117  The Court explains that   
An anticipatory warrant, by definition, is a warrant that has been issued 
before the necessary events have occurred which will allow a constitutional 
search of the premises; if those events do not transpire, the warrant is void. 
This is not to say, however, that such warrants are not based on probable 
cause. To the contrary, when a government official presents independent 
evidence indicating that delivery of contraband will, or is likely to, occur, 
and when the magistrate conditions the warrant on that delivery, there is 
sufficient probable cause to uphold the warrant. Thus, the fact that the 
                                                 
116  In Michigan, the seminal case acknowledging the validity of anticipatory warrants is People v. Kaslowski, 608 
N.W.2d 539, 543 (Mich. App. 2000) (permitting anticipatory warrants as long as they “adequately established the 
narrow circumstances upon which the police were authorized to execute the warrant”). Overall, courts in over half 
the states have upheld the validity of anticipatory warrants, including Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, 
California, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Massachusetts, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, 
New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, 
Tennessee, Utah, Virginia and Wisconsin.  See Norma Rotumo, Validity of Anticipatory Search Warrants—State 
Cases, 67 A.L.R.5th 361 (2004). 
117 882 F.2d 699 (2nd Cir. 1989). 
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contraband is not “presently located at the place described in the warrant” is 
immaterial, so long as “there is probable cause to believe that it will be 
there when the search warrant is executed.” Nor should it be otherwise, for 
even a warrant based on a known presence of contraband at the premises 
rests also on the expectation that the contraband will remain there until the 
warrant is executed.118 
 
In other words, an anticipatory warrant is constitutionally valid only insofar as (1) there is 
probable cause to believe the underlying offense will be committed and (2) the specific 
conditions which trigger the warrant are actually met.  Ultimately, anticipatory warrants serve 
the purpose of the Fourth Amendment “by allowing an agent to obtain a warrant in advance of 
the delivery” of contraband, rather than “forcing him to go to the scene without a warrant, and, if 
necessary, proceed under the constraints of the ‘exigent circumstances’ exception, subject always 
to the risk of ‘being second-guessed’ by judicial authorities at a later date as to whether the 
known facts legally justified the search.”119 
Despite superficial similarities, anticipatory warrants are quite distinct from ex parte 
protection orders.  An anticipatory warrant must be supported by probable cause to believe that 
the conditions outlined with specificity within the warrant will actually come to pass,120 whereas 
an ex parte protection orders need not allege that specific conduct is even remotely likely to 
occur in order to enjoin the conduct.121  Moreover, the conduct enjoined by ex parte protection 
orders need not even be illegal.122  Therefore, while a court could arguably issue an anticipatory 
arrest warrant for a misdemeanor infraction upon the fulfillment of some condition other than a 
police officer’s direct observation of the infraction, the fact remains that the warrant is still 
directed at arresting the suspect for underlying criminal activity—and as such, the suspect is at 
                                                 
118 U.S. v. Garcia, 882 F.2d 699, 702 (2nd Cir. 1989). 
119 Garcia, 882 F.2d at 703 (quoting W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE 700-01 (1978)). 
120 See supra, note 116 and accompanying text. 
121 See supra, notes 108-111 and accompanying text. 
122 See supra, note 33 and accompanying text. 
 27
least constructively on notice to avoid the activity.    PPOs, however, provide no such 
constructive notice to those against whom they may be immediately enforced. 
 Ultimately, warrantless arrests pursuant to unnoticed, ex parte protection orders fail to 
satisfy even the most minimal requirements of the Due Process Clause, and all creative 
arguments in favor of their constitutional validity are fatally flawed.  The problems which ex 
parte protection orders are intended to address, however, remain as urgent as ever.  The next 
section of this Comment explores possible alternatives to the current system. 
 
III. PROPOSALS 
Despite the problems with the current statute, domestic relations PPOs do serve an 
important function in society’s efforts to eradicate domestic violence.  As such, eliminating 
PPOs altogether would be ill-advised.  Several changes to the current statute, however, are 
necessary in order to bring this form of injunctive relief within the limits prescribed by Due 
Process and the Warrant Clause.  First of all, the statute should be amended so that no individual 
is subject to arrest for violating an ex parte protection order until that individual has received 
notice of the order.  The current provision allowing officers responding to a complaint to provide 
this notice and require immediate compliance with the terms of the PPO under pain of arrest123 is 
simply insufficient to protect the liberty interests of the individual enjoined by the order.124  
Therefore, the legislature ought to amend the statute to require proof of service prior to 
informing law enforcement of the existence of a personal protection order.125  
                                                 
123 MCLA 600.2950(22). 
124 See supra, notes 36-38 and accompanying text. 
125 See APPENDIX, 600.2950(17). 
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Second, an ex parte order enjoining an individual from entering his or her own home is 
almost certainly unconstitutional.126  Injunctions against entering one’s place of employment or 
schooling implicate similarly weighty private interests, and may also be unconstitutional.  As 
such, the legislature ought to require a pre-deprivation hearing in order to enjoin any of these 
actions.  If, however, such ex parte orders are nevertheless upheld, additional procedural 
safeguards could mitigate the deprivations they cause.  The current statute simply requires that a 
hearing be held within fourteen days of the filing of a petition to rescind or modify a protection 
order.127  In the event that an ex parte protection order enjoins or restrains an individual from 
entering his or her domicile, place of employment, or place of education, the deprivation caused 
by the order could be reduced by requiring a hearing immediately upon petitioner’s filing of a 
motion to rescind or modify the order.  Although due process is not an exact science,128 it would 
be ideal to hold the hearing within twenty-four hours of the deprivation.  Although requiring 
such an expedited hearing would strain judicial resources, the private interests affected in these 
cases and the risk of erroneous deprivation of these interests is substantial given the ex parte 
nature of the proceedings which lead to the injunction.129    
Finally, after eliminating the aspects of the domestic relations personal protection order 
statute which offend Due Process and the Warrant Clause,130 one might wonder what assistance 
can be given to victims of domestic violence in the period between the granting of an ex parte 
protection order and the effectuation of service upon the respondent, especially when the 
respondent is evading service.131  Fortunately, there are effective, constitutional methods of 
                                                 
126 See supra, Section II(A)(2). 
127 See MCLA 600.2950(14); when a PPO enjoins a respondent from possessing a firearm, however, the current 
statute requires that a hearing be scheduled within five days of the filing or a motion to rescind or modify!  Id. 
128 See supra, note 40. 
129 See supra, Section II(A)(2). 
130 See infra, APPENDIX. 
131 See supra, notes 13-14 and accompanying text. 
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curtailing such abuses.  For example, when there is evidence indicating that the individual 
restrained or enjoined by the order is evading service, the petitioner could request a second, 
expedited hearing in order to determine whether evasion is in fact occurring.  In the event that 
the respondent is shown, perhaps by a preponderance of the evidence, to be intentionally evading 
service, the court would be empowered to make a finding on the record to that effect, and charge 
the respondent with actual knowledge of the ex parte protection order and constructive 
knowledge of its terms.132  While this requirement would cause some delay in the enforceability 
of a protection order, it would serve as an important procedural safeguard by insuring that 
individuals who truly have not received notice of the protection order through no fault of their 
own are not held accountable for violations of an ex parte order. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Michigan’s domestic relations personal protection order statute makes a mockery of the 
constitutional rights of anyone unlucky enough to find him or herself the target of PPO.   The 
weight of the individual interests at stake coupled with the risk that an ex parte proceeding will 
cause an erroneous deprivation of those interests leads to the conclusion that the enforcement of 
many ex parte protection orders does not comport with the minimum requirements of procedural 
due process.   Although each case must be analyzed separately to determine whether 
enforcement of an ex parte PPO violates due process, it is safe to say that the more substantial 
the private interest affected, the more likely the PPO will fail to satisfy due process.133  
Furthermore, subjecting an individual to warrantless arrest for violating an ex parte order of 
which he or she had no knowledge offends the Warrant Clause.  Rather than continuing to 
                                                 
132 See infra, APPENDIX at 600.2950(18). 
133 See supra, Section III.   
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acquiesce to the demands of victims’ rights advocates while depriving citizens of their 
constitutional rights, Michigan’s legislature ought to take immediate action.  By amending 
Michigan’s current statute, most of the protections currently afforded to victims of domestic 
violence may be retained while steering clear of constitutional pitfalls.    
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APPENDIX 
 
(Proposed revisions to MCLA 600.2950134) 
 
 
Michigan Compiled Laws Annotated  
Chapter 600. Revised Judicature Act of 1961 
Revised Judicature Act of 1961  
Chapter 29: Provisions Concerning Specific Actions  
600.2950. Injunction against specific persons, conditions; personal protection orders, terms, 
reasonable cause, exceptions; application of section; entry into law enforcement 
information network 
 
 
Sec. 2950. (1) Except as provided in subsections (27) and (28), by commencing an independent 
action to obtain relief under this section, by joining a claim to an action, or by filing a motion in 
an action in which the petitioner and the individual to be restrained or enjoined are parties, an 
individual may petition the family division of circuit court to enter a personal protection order to 
restrain or enjoin a spouse, a former spouse, an individual with whom he or she has had a child 
in common, an individual with whom he or she has or has had a dating relationship, or an 
individual residing or having resided in the same household as the petitioner from doing 1 or 
more of the following: 
 
(a) Entering onto premises, although in the event that the petitioner and the enjoined 
individual live in the same domicile, this relief is subject to subsections (14). 
 
(b) Assaulting, attacking, beating, molesting, or wounding a named individual. 
 
(c) Threatening to kill or physically injure a named individual. 
 
(d) Removing minor children from the individual having legal custody of the children, except as 
otherwise authorized by a custody or parenting time order issued by a court of competent 
jurisdiction. 
 
(e) Purchasing or possessing a firearm. 
 
(f) Interfering with petitioner's efforts to remove petitioner's children or personal property from 
premises that are solely owned or leased by the individual to be restrained or enjoined. 
 
(g) Interfering with petitioner at petitioner's place of employment or education or engaging in 
conduct that impairs petitioner's employment or educational relationship or environment, 
                                                 
134 The entire text of 600.2950, along with proposed changes, is included.  Proposed deletions are indicated by 
“struck through” type, thus: deletion.  Proposed additions are indicated by type which is bold and underlined, thus: 
addition. 
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although in the event that the petitioner and the enjoined individual are employed in the 
same location or attend the same school or educational environment, this provision is 
subject to subsection (14). 
 
(h) Having access to information in records concerning a minor child of both petitioner and 
respondent that will inform respondent about the address or telephone number of petitioner and 
petitioner's minor child or about petitioner's employment address. 
 
(i) Engaging in conduct that is prohibited under section 411h or 411i of the Michigan penal code, 
1931 PA 328, MCL 750.411h and 750.411i. 
 
(j) Any other specific act or conduct that imposes upon or interferes with personal liberty or that 
causes a reasonable apprehension of violence. 
 
(2) If the respondent is a person who is issued a license to carry a concealed weapon and is 
required to carry a weapon as a condition of his or her employment, a police officer certified by 
the commission on law enforcement standards act, 1965 PA 203, MCL 28.601to 28.616, a 
sheriff, a deputy sheriff or a member of the Michigan department of state police, a local 
corrections officer, department of corrections employee, or a federal law enforcement officer 
who carries a firearm during the normal course of his or her employment, the petitioner shall 
notify the court of the respondent's occupation prior to the issuance of the personal protection 
order. This subsection does not apply to a petitioner who does not know the respondent's 
occupation. 
 
(3) A petitioner may omit his or her address of residence from documents filed with the court 
under this section. If a petitioner omits his or her address of residence, the petitioner shall 
provide the court with a mailing address. 
 
(4) The court shall issue a personal protection order under this section if the court determines that 
there is reasonable cause to believe that the individual to be restrained or enjoined may commit 1 
or more of the acts listed in subsection (1). In determining whether reasonable cause exists, the 
court shall consider all of the following: 
 
(a) Testimony, documents, or other evidence offered in support of the request for a personal 
protection order. 
 
(b) Whether the individual to be restrained or enjoined has previously committed or threatened to 
commit 1 or more of the acts listed in subsection (1). 
 
(5) A court shall not issue a personal protection order that restrains or enjoins conduct described 
in subsection (1)(a) if all of the following apply: 
 
(a) The individual to be restrained or enjoined is not the spouse of the moving party. 
 
(b) The individual to be restrained or enjoined or the parent, guardian, or custodian of the minor 
to be restrained or enjoined has a property interest in the premises. 
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(c) The moving party or the parent, guardian, or custodian of a minor petitioner has no property 
interest in the premises. 
 
(6) A court shall not refuse to issue a personal protection order solely due to the absence of any 
of the following: 
 
(a) A police report. 
 
(b) A medical report. 
 
(c) A report or finding of an administrative agency. 
 
(d) Physical signs of abuse or violence. 
 
(7) If the court refuses to grant a personal protection order, it shall state immediately in writing 
the specific reasons it refused to issue a personal protection order. If a hearing is held, the court 
shall also immediately state on the record the specific reasons it refuses to issue a personal 
protection order. 
 
(8) A personal protection order shall not be made mutual. Correlative separate personal 
protection orders are prohibited unless both parties have properly petitioned the court pursuant to 
subsection (1). 
 
(9) A personal protection order is effective and immediately enforceable anywhere in this state, 
when signed by a judge. Upon service, a personal protection order and may also be enforced by 
another state, an Indian tribe, or a territory of the United States, upon service. 
 
(10) The court shall designate the law enforcement agency that is responsible for entering the 
personal protection order into the law enforcement information network as provided by the 
L.E.I.N. policy council act of 1974, 1974 PA 163, MCL 28.211 to 28.216. 
 
(11) A personal protection order shall include all of the following, and to the extent practicable 
the following shall be contained in a single form: 
 
(a) A statement that the personal protection order has been entered to restrain or enjoin conduct 
listed in the order and that violation of the personal protection order will subject the individual 
restrained or enjoined to 1 or more of the following: 
 
(i) If the respondent is 17 years of age or more, immediate arrest and the civil and criminal 
contempt powers of the court, and that if he or she is found guilty of criminal contempt, he or she 
shall be imprisoned for not more than 93 days and may be fined not more than $500.00. 
 
(ii) If the respondent is less than 17 years of age, immediate apprehension or being taken into 
custody, and subject to the dispositional alternatives listed in section 18 of chapter XIIA of the 
probate code of 1939, 1939 PA 288, MCL 712A.18. 
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(iii) If the respondent violates the personal protection order in a jurisdiction other than this state, 
the respondent is subject to the enforcement procedures and penalties of the state, Indian tribe, or 
United States territory under whose jurisdiction the violation occurred. 
 
(b) A statement that the personal protection order is effective and immediately enforceable 
anywhere in this state upon service, when signed by a judge, and that, upon service, a personal 
protection order also may be enforced by another state, an Indian tribe, or a territory of the 
United States. 
 
(c) A statement listing the type or types of conduct enjoined. 
 
(d) An expiration date stated clearly on the face of the order. 
 
(e) A statement that the personal protection order is enforceable anywhere in Michigan by any 
law enforcement agency. 
 
(f) The law enforcement agency designated by the court to enter the personal protection order 
into the law enforcement information network. 
 
(g) For ex parte orders, a statement that the individual restrained or enjoined may file a motion to 
modify or rescind the personal protection order and request a hearing within 14 days after the 
individual restrained or enjoined has been served or has received actual notice of the order and 
that motion forms and filing instructions are available from the clerk of the court. 
 
(12) An ex parte personal protection order shall be issued and effective without  upon receipt of 
written or oral notice to by the individual restrained or enjoined or his or her attorney if it clearly 
appears from specific facts shown by verified complaint, written motion, or affidavit that 
immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result from the delay required to 
effectuate notice or that the notice will itself precipitate adverse action before a personal 
protection order can be issued.  If it clearly appears from specific facts shown by the verified 
complaint, written motion, or affidavit that the notice will itself precipitate adverse action 
before the protection order can be issued, the order may be issued without notice but will 
not be enforceable against the respondent until respondent receives notice of the order. 
 
(13) A personal protection order issued under subsection (12) is valid for not less than 182 days. 
The individual restrained or enjoined may file a motion to modify or rescind the personal 
protection order and request a hearing under the Michigan court rules. The motion to modify or 
rescind the personal protection order shall be filed within 14 days after the order is served or 
after the individual restrained or enjoined has received actual notice of the personal protection 
order unless good cause is shown for filing the motion after the 14 days have elapsed. 
 
(14) Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, the court shall schedule a hearing on the 
motion to modify or rescind the ex parte personal protection order within 14 days after the filing 
of the motion to modify or rescind. If the respondent is a person described in subsection (2) and 
the personal protection order prohibits him or her from purchasing or possessing a firearm, the 
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court shall schedule a hearing on the motion to modify or rescind the ex parte personal protection 
order within 5 days after the filing of the motion to modify or rescind.  In the event that the 
protection order enjoins the individual from entry into his or her domicile, place of 
employment, or place of education, the individual enjoined or restrained by the order shall 
have the right to a hearing within 24 hours of filing the motion to modify or rescind.  
 
(15) The clerk of the court that issues a personal protection order shall do all of the following 
immediately upon issuance and without requiring  receiving proof the order has been served 
on the individual restrained or enjoined: 
 
(a) File a true copy of the personal protection order with the law enforcement agency designated 
by the court in the personal protection order. 
 
(b) Provide the petitioner with not less than 2 true copies of the personal protection order. 
 
(c) If respondent is identified in the pleadings as a law enforcement officer, notify the officer's 
employing law enforcement agency, if known, about the existence of the personal protection 
order. 
 
(d) If the personal protection order prohibits respondent from purchasing or possessing a firearm, 
notify the concealed weapon licensing board in respondent's county of residence about the 
existence and contents of the personal protection order. 
 
(e) If the respondent is identified in the pleadings as a department of corrections employee, 
notify the state department of corrections about the existence of the personal protection order. 
 
(f) If the respondent is identified in the pleadings as being a person who may have access to 
information concerning the petitioner or a child of the petitioner or respondent and that 
information is contained in friend of the court records, notify the friend of the court for the 
county in which the information is located about the existence of the personal protection order. 
 
(16) The clerk of the court shall inform the petitioner that he or she may take a true copy of the 
personal protection order to the law enforcement agency designated by the court in subsection 
(10) to be immediately entered into the law enforcement information network. 
 
(17) The law enforcement agency that receives a true copy of the personal protection order under 
subsection (15) or (16) and proof of service shall immediately and without requiring proof of 
service enter the personal protection order into the law enforcement information network as 
provided by the L.E.I.N. policy council act of 1974, 1974 PA 163, MCL 28.211 to 28.216. 
 
(18) A personal protection order issued under this section shall be served personally or by 
registered or certified mail, return receipt requested, delivery restricted to the addressee at the 
last known address or addresses of the individual restrained or enjoined or by any other manner 
provided in the Michigan court rules. If the individual restrained or enjoined has not been served, 
a law enforcement officer or clerk of the court who knows that a personal protection order exists 
may, at any time, serve the individual restrained or enjoined with a true copy of the order or 
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advise the individual restrained or enjoined about the existence of the personal protection order, 
the specific conduct enjoined, the penalties for violating the order, and where the individual 
restrained or enjoined may obtain a copy of the order. If the respondent is less than 18 years of 
age, the parent, guardian, or custodian of that individual shall also be served personally or by 
registered or certified mail, return receipt requested, delivery restricted to the addressee at the 
last known address or addresses of the parent, guardian, or custodian of the individual restrained 
or enjoined. A proof of service or proof of oral notice shall be filed with the clerk of the court 
issuing the personal protection order. This subsection does not prohibit the immediate 
effectiveness of a personal protection order or its immediate enforcement under subsections (21) 
and (22).  If it appears that the individual restrained or enjoined by the order is evading 
service, the court in which the order was issued shall, upon the request of the original 
petitioner, hold a hearing within one day of the request in order to determine whether 
evasion of service is in fact occurring.  In the event that the individual is shown by a 
preponderance of the evidence to be intentionally evading service, the court will make a 
finding on the record to that effect, the individual will be charged with actual knowledge of 
the order and constructive knowledge of its terms, and the order will be immediately 
enforceable. 
 
(19) The clerk of the court shall immediately notify the law enforcement agency that received the 
personal protection order under subsection (15) or (16) if either of the following occurs: 
 
(a) The clerk of the court has received proof that the individual restrained or enjoined has been 
served. 
 
(b) The personal protection order is rescinded, modified, or extended by court order. 
 
(20) The law enforcement agency that receives information under subsection (19) shall enter the 
information or cause the information to be entered into the law enforcement information network 
as provided by the L.E.I.N. policy council act of 1974, 1974 PA 163, MCL 28.211 to 28.216. 
 
(21) Subject to subsection (22), a A personal protection order is immediately enforceable 
anywhere in this state by any law enforcement agency that has received a true copy of the order 
and proof of service upon the enjoined individual, is shown a copy of it, these documents, or 
has verified its their existence on the law enforcement information network as provided by the 
L.E.I.N. policy council act of 1974, 1974 PA 163, MCL 28.211 to 28.216. 
 
(22) If the individual restrained or enjoined has not been served, the law enforcement agency or 
officer responding to a call alleging a violation of a personal protection order shall serve the 
individual restrained or enjoined with a true copy of the order or advise the individual restrained 
or enjoined about the existence of the personal protection order, the specific conduct enjoined, 
the penalties for violating the order, and where the individual restrained or enjoined may obtain a 
copy of the order. The law enforcement officer shall enforce the personal protection order and 
immediately enter or cause to be entered into the law enforcement information network that the 
individual restrained or enjoined has actual notice of the personal protection order. The law 
enforcement officer also shall file a proof of service or proof of oral notice with the clerk of the 
court issuing the personal protection order. If the individual restrained or enjoined has not 
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received notice of the personal protection order, the individual restrained or enjoined shall be 
given an opportunity to comply with the personal protection order before the law enforcement 
officer makes a custodial arrest for violation of the personal protection order.  The failure to 
immediately comply with the personal protection order shall be grounds for an immediate 
custodial arrest. This subsection does not preclude an arrest under section 15 or 15a of chapter 
IV of the code of criminal procedure, 1927 PA 175, MCL 764.15 and 764.15a, or a proceeding 
under section 14 of chapter XIIA of the probate code of 1939, 1939 PA 288, MCL 712A.14. 
 
(23) (22) An individual who is 17 years of age or more and who refuses or fails to comply with a 
personal protection order under this section is subject to the criminal contempt powers of the 
court and, if found guilty, shall be imprisoned for not more than 93 days and may be fined not 
more than $500.00. An individual who is less than 17 years of age and who refuses or fails to 
comply with a personal protection order issued under this section is subject to the dispositional 
alternatives listed in section 18 of chapter XIIA of the probate code of 1939, 1939 PA 288, MCL 
712A.18. The criminal penalty provided for under this section may be imposed in addition to a 
penalty that may be imposed for another criminal offense arising from the same conduct. 
 
(24) (23) An individual who knowingly and intentionally makes a false statement to the court in 
support of his or her petition for a personal protection order is subject to the contempt powers of 
the court. 
 
(25) (24) A personal protection order issued under this section is also enforceable under chapter 
XIIA of the probate code of 1939, 1939 PA 288, MCL 712A.1 to 712.A32, and section 15b of 
chapter IV of the code of criminal procedure, 1927 PA 175, MCL 764.15b. 
 
(26) (25) A personal protection order issued under this section is also enforceable under chapter 
17. 
 
(27) (26) A court shall not issue a personal protection order that restrains or enjoins conduct 
described in subsection (1) if any of the following apply: 
 
(a) The respondent is the unemancipated minor child of the petitioner. 
 
(b) The petitioner is the unemancipated minor child of the respondent. 
 
(c) The respondent is a minor child less than 10 years of age. 
 
(28) (27) If the respondent is less than 18 years of age, issuance of a personal protection order 
under this section is subject to chapter XIIA of the probate code of 1939, 1939 PA 288, MCL 
712A.1 to 712A.32. 
 
(29) (28) A personal protection order that is issued prior to the effective date of the amendatory 
act that added this subsection is not invalid on the ground that it does not comply with 1 or more 
of the requirements added by this amendatory act. 
 
(30) (29) As used in this section: 
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(a) "Dating relationship" means frequent, intimate associations primarily characterized by the 
expectation of affectional involvement. This term does not include a casual relationship or an 
ordinary fraternization between 2 individuals in a business or social context. 
 
(b) "Federal law enforcement officer" means an officer or agent employed by a law enforcement 
agency of the United States government whose primary responsibility is the enforcement of laws 
of the United States. 
 
(c) "Personal protection order" means an injunctive order issued by the circuit court or the family 
division of circuit court restraining or enjoining activity and individuals listed in subsection (1). 
 
